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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16669

t1ARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with aggravated robbery
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302

(1953), as amended.

She was convicted of that crime by a jury in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of
Salt Lake, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

This

is an appeal from that conviction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty.

The court entered

judgment and sentenced the aoµellant to serve the statutory
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 1299-1301).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction
rendered in the court below.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On July 18, 1978, four individu2:s were seen

getti~·

into a black and silver Camaro in the vicinity of 169
Wentworth Avenue

(Appellant Griffin's residence)

(R. 372.3?\i

The appellant and three other persons were later seen in the
Camaro

(R.

398).

The car stopped in front of the House of

Sherman Beauty Salon; two men got out of the car and entered
that establishment

(R. 400).

One of the men wore a moustache, a beard and a blor::
Afro wig

(R.

733).

The other man wore gray pants, a black

turtleneck sweater and was disguised as a black man (R. 644).
He wore a black Afro wig and his skin apoeared to be painted
black (R.

57 5,

58 3, 644) .

Both men were armed

(R. 574, 576.

710, 732).

The appellants ordered the younger women in the
salon to sit on the floor and everyone was told to take off
their jewelry (R.

401-405).

The men then shoved jewelry

and purses into a large tote bag and took money from the
salon's safe

(R.

402-406).

At approximately 2:29 p.m. Detective Labrum s~
Marcella Griffin get out of the black and silver Camaro

a~

walk up the steps leading to the entrance of the House of
Sherman.

He then saw her walk back down those steps

carrying several purses.

She got into the Camaro and drove
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away

(R. 786-793).

Within a short time the car was

stopped by Detectives Welti and Lightfoot (R. 1047).
The two men fled from the scene of the crime
in a 1974 beige-colored Volkswagen belonging to one of
the hairdressers at the salon, Dawn Harmon (R. 1010).
They drove to the residence of Vivian Gonzales, left
their disguises there and drove away in a 1969 Green
Chevrolet

(R. 1101).

It was later revealed that the car

was owned by Marcella Griffin (R. 1149).
After the Camara was stopped, Detective Voyles
asked Marcella Griff in if he could take her children out
of her home on Wentworth Avenue, search for the suspects
and make the area safe.
1133).

Mrs. Griffin consented (R. 1128,

It was after 3:00 p.m. when the officers began

to search the house

(R. 1137, 1163).

While the officers

were still in the house, a green Chevrolet parked on the
road near appellant Griffin's house (R. 1092, 1149).
was approximately 4:30 p.m. at that time (R. 1181).
men got out of the car and walked up the driveway.

It
Two
The

appellants appeared to be heading for the back door; the
two men tried but could not get in the back door.
left the back area but later appeared to return.

The men
An officer

came out to head off the appellants and it was at that
time that a duffel bag containing a gun and other evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

of the crime was found on the back porch.

~h
- e

appellants

were arrested while trying to pry a window open in the
front of the house

(R, 1183).

The green Chevrolet was

thereafter impounded and an inventory search was conducted
at the stationhouse

(R. 1149).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF
CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE GRIFFIN RESIDENCE;
THE DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN PLAIN VIEW WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
A party may waive his or her constitutional

ri~t

to be free from an unreasonable search by consenting to
the search of a house which would otherwise be im?roper.
Schneckloth v.

Bustamente, 412 U.S.

218

(1973).

A search

can be upheld on the basis of consent if the individual
consents to a search voluntarily with no duress or coercion.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543

(1968).

This Court

has likewise held that a search made pursuant to a homeowner''
consent is lawful.
580,

582

State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2c

(1965).
The appellant does not argue that the consent she

gave to search the Griffin residence

was involuntary.

She

admits that valid consent was given to remove the Griffin
children, search for the suspects and make the area safe.
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The appellant does not question the trial court's ruling
that the duffel bag was lawfully seized on the theory that
it was in plain view and seized incident to the appellant's
arrest.

However, appellant argues that the officers exceeded

the scope of the consent because they remained at the Griffin
residence until the suspects arrived and, therefore, the
duffel bag was inadmissible evidence.
The determination as to the reasonableness of a
search is for the trial judge due to the responsibility of
the court in controlling the admissibility of evidence and
his advantaged position in passing on such matters.
Criscola, 444 P.2d 5l7, 519

(1968).

State v.

His rulings should be

"indulged with a presumption of correctness, and should not
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error."
Id, Respondent contends that the search of the house was
reasonable since the objectives of the search, consented to
by the appellant, were not exceeded.
When a purpose is included in the request to search,
as it is in this case, the consent is construed as authorizing
only that intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish
the stated purpose:
Where permission has been given to .
search for a particular object. the ensuing
search remains valid as long as its scope
is consistent with an effort to locate
that object.
State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860 (Maine 1974)

(emphasis added).
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The only limits prescribed in the consent to searcc
given by the appellant were
for her children,
and

(3)

( l) the officers were to look

( 2) they were to search for the susoects,

they were to make the area safe--they were to

look for nothing else but the children and the suspects.
No time limit was placed on the search' it is difficult
to estimate just how long it would take to "make the
area safe."

The search was at all times consistent wiili

the stated objectives.

The officers did not use the

consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory
search,

There is no evidence showing that the officers

searched drawers, containers, etc., which could not be
used to conceal a person.
This does not mean, however, that when consent
is given to search for a particular object the police may
never seize something other than the designated items,
Of course, if the government agents
acting within the parameters of defendant's
consent had come upon contraband, fruits or
instrumentalities of crime, or clear evidence
of criminal behavior which was lying in
plain view, they could have seized those
items ,
United,States v. Dichiarinte, 4115 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971).
Thus, when an officer is in a position where he has the
right to be, sees evidence in plain view, and reasonably
believes the object to be evidence of the crime, seizure
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of such evidence is lawful.
the plain view doctrine.

This Court has acknowledged

In State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125,

cert. denied 434 U.S. 871 (1977), this Court upheld the
admissibility of a bottle containing heroin which was
seized at the appellant's home:
The officers were where they had a
right to be.
Without any intrusion upon
the defendant, their attention was arrested
by activities which indicated quite
unmistakenably that he was committing a
felony.
Therefore, they could arrest him
without a warrant; and they could take
anything in the immediate area which was
so involved in the criminal conduct that
it would serve as evidence in proof of the
crime.
Though the bottle from which the
narcotic had been taken was placed on the
dresser in the adjoining bedroom, it was
in the immediate vicinity; and it was in
plain view in that no search was required
to discover it.
In fact the charge that
there was a search" in this case is for
that reason a distortion of language,
because there was really no "search"
involved.
Id. at 1127, 1128

(emphasis added).

Respondent submits that the officers were in a
position where they had a right to be since the scope of
the consent to search had not been exceeded and that the
bag found at the residence containing evidence of the
crime was admissible evidence found in plain view during
the attempt to arrest the appellants.

The trial court

agreed that the officers had a right to be in the house
at the time the appellants arrived and that the duffel
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bag was lawfully seized .
. the officer was there with her
(Marcella Griffin's) permission, to look
for the subjects, suspects, and went out the
back door, didn't see this big sport suit case
(duffel bag), and later when he did go it was
there.
Probably the inference I would draw
it was taken with them when they got out of'
the green automobile and came to the house
and dropped it when they couldn't get in the
back door.
Therefore, part of the instrumentalities of the crime and the fruits of the crime
and incident to arrest, they could ~ick that®
and possess it and use it in evidence against.
the subjects--suspects in this case.
(R.1147)
In this case the officers had the right to be
the Griffin residence.

~

The Appellant had given them

permission to enter the house, obtain her children for
safekeeping, search for the suspects and make the area
safe.

The officers had not exceeded the scope of the

consent by looking for anything other than the children
and the suspects; nor did the officers remain there for an
unreasonable amount of time.

The testimony at trial indicate:

that the officers arrived at the Griffin residence after
3:00 p.m.

(R. 1137), and began the search.

arrived at approximately 4: 30 p.m.

The male suspects

(R. 1181).

The record

does not indicate just what efforts were taken to ensure
the safety of the children or to search for the suspects.
Furthermore, the record does not indicate what procedures
(or their extensiveness) were taken to make the area safe.
It is, therefore, difficult to tell from the record whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the time spent searching the appellant's home was unreasonable.
The record does show that an officer was searching the back
area of the house, including the porch where the duffel
bag was later found,

just 15-20 minutes before the

appellants arrived at the residence (R. 1165).

Seizure of

the duffel bag cannot be said to exceed the scope of the
consent search.

The duffel bag was seen in plain view and

under circumstances giving rise to the reasonable belief
that the evidence had been left there by the two men
when they tried to enter the back door.

The trial court,

therefore, did not err in ruling that the evidence was
admissible.

The evidence was not the fruit of an

unreasonable search since it was seen in plain view by an
officer who had the right, by the appellant's consent, to
be in a position to see the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The determination as to the reasonableness of a
search is for the determination of the trial judge and his
rulings should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears
that he was in error.

The trial judge in this case properly

ruled that the officers had a right to be in the Griffin
residence--they had not exceeded the scope of the consent
search.

Furthermore the evidence seized at that time was

found in plain view and therefore was admissable evidence.
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Respondent, therefore, urges this Court to affirm
the judgment of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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